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This paper studies how liberalization affects productivity 
growth using micro-level plant data. While previous 
studies have already shown the existence of a positive 
relationship between competition and economic 
performance, the novelty of this paper is that it analyzes 
not only the average impact of liberalization, but 
also goes “beyond the average” and shows how the 
liberalization can affect dissimilar plants in a different 
way. The author first develops a model which predicts 
that, while the impact of liberalization on productivity 
growth is positive “on average”, more advanced firms 
tend to benefit more. In fact, liberalization generates two 
competing effects: on one side it spurs more innovative 
efforts because of the increased entry threat by foreign 
competitors, on the other side, enhanced competition 
curtails expected profits and reduces the funds available 
to finance innovative activities. The pro-competitive 
effect is weaker for less advanced firms as for them it is 
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harder to catch-up with the “technology frontier”. These 
predictions are then tested focusing on Mexican plants 
during the NAFTA liberalization. The results show that 
a 1 percent reduction in tariffs spurred productivity 
growth between 4 and 8 percent on average. However, 
for backward firms this effect is much weaker if not close 
to zero, otherwise for more advanced ones this effect 
is stronger with productivity growing between 11 and 
13 percent. Consistent with the theoretical model the 
results are stronger in those sectors where the scope for 
innovative activities is more pronounced. These results 
are particularly important for policy makers because they 
suggest that while increasing competition may be good 
in spurring average productivity, it is also true that this 
effect does not hold for all type of firms, in particular 
more backward firms may need some complementary 
support policy to upgrade their capacities and keep up 
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11 Introduction
“Do countries with lower barriers to international trade experience faster economic progress?
Few questions have been more vigorously debated in the history of economic thought, and
none is more central to the vast literature on trade and development.” (Rodriguez and
Rodrik 1999)
The relationship between liberalization and economic performance has been strongly debated since
Adam Smith and it is still today at the center of disputes. Even more than academic economists,
policy makers consider the subject central to their concerns. In particular developing countries, that
during the 1990s have undergone profound liberalizations1 with the objective of improving their eco-
nomic performance and accelerating their growth rates, have recently started to put these policies
under discussions because of mixed results.2. In this study we will try to explain why liberalization
can result in outcomes that are diﬀerent depending on the context and, more in particular, are uneven
for heterogenous ﬁrms.
In this paper we develop a model that shows how the impact of liberalization can be asymmetric for
diﬀerent types of ﬁrms and test its main predictions focusing the liberalization that Mexico under-
went during NAFTA. This provides an excellent opportunity to study a deep process of liberalization
and integration with the global economy that increased the pressures from import competition and
entry threat of foreign competitors. We will analyze it and show that, consistent with our theoretical
model, the impact of NAFTA was highly asymmetric on diﬀerent types of ﬁrms and, while produc-
tivity growth “on average” is larger for those ﬁrms in sectors where tariﬀs dropped more, at the same
time, this eﬀect is weaker for plants more distant from the production technology frontier.
A number of previous studies using ﬁrm-level3 data have already shown that an increase in import
competition tends to have a positive impact on economic performance (Tybout and Westbrook 1995,
L´ opez-C´ ordova 2003, Pavcnik 2002, De Hoyos and Iacovone 2006, Nickell 1996, Fernandes 2007).
However, these studies normally focused on the “average” impact of liberalization and implicitly as-
1As discussed in a recent World Bank report over the last few decades almost all developing countries have liberalized
their trade regimes (Bank 2006)
2“In many developing countries, there has already been a de-industrialisation process in which lowering of tariﬀs
has led to imports displacing local industries” (Martin Khor 1999, Director of Third World Network)
“Some trade critics are bothered by the disappointing performance of Latin America since it slashed tariﬀs in the
1980s and 1990s while more protectionist China and Southeast Asia sped ahead” (“Pains from free trade spurs second
thoughts”, Wall Street Journal, 30 March 1997).
3In the paper we refer interchangeably to “ﬁrm” and “plant”, however it is important to emphasize that in our
empirical analysis the unit of observation will be the plant consistently with the unit of observation of our data.
2sume that the eﬀect of liberalization is homogeneous for all ﬁrms.4 Diﬀerently, some recent work
from Aghion, Blundell, Griﬃth, Howitt, and Prantl (2004) shows that the eﬀect of competition is
non-linear and heterogenous depending on the productivity level of the ﬁrm. Only “good ﬁrms”(e.g.
close to the productive frontier) are positively aﬀected by competition as their innovative eﬀort is
enhanced in response to the increased entry threat of foreign competitors. Vice-versa “bad ﬁrms”
(e.g. far from the productive frontier) are negatively aﬀected because the intensiﬁed entry threat only
reduces their expected proﬁts as their eﬃciency is too low to allow them to compete successfully with
foreign entrants(Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and Zilibotti 2004).
In this paper we contribute to the existing literature in two ways. On the theoretical front we develop
a neo-Schumpterian model that extends previous work by Aghion, Blundell, Griﬃth, Howitt, and
Prantl (2004) and still reaches consistent results with their model at industry-level, while generating
novel results at the ﬁrm-level. These results are more in line with much of the ﬁrm-level studies point-
ing toward a positive impact trade liberalization on ﬁrm performance “on average”. Consequently we
bring such a model to the data and test it by using plant-level data from a developing country. Our
approach, diﬀerently from much of the previous literature that analyzed the eﬀect of liberalization
in a cross-country setting focusing mostly on outcomes (e.g. relationship between growth and open-
ness), is much more micro and concentrates on a speciﬁc mechanism through which liberalization
may inﬂuence ﬁrms’ responses (see literature review by Hallak and Levinsohn (2004)).
The paper is divided into ﬁve sections. In the next section we discuss the existing literature related to
our study. In the third one we present a set of stylized facts and sketch the theoretical model, which
generates two main predictions tested in the subsequent econometric analysis presented in section
four. The last section concludes and highlights some avenues for further research.
2 Existing Literature
This paper is related to various strands of the literature, in particular the recent works of Aghion
and Bessonova (2006) and Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and Zilibotti (2004) arguing that liberalization
boosts innovative eﬀorts, but only for those ﬁrms that are more productive while it weakens the in-
centive to innovate for less productive ones. These models are characterized by three main elements.
First, innovation is the main driver of ﬁrm-level growth. Second, a ﬁrm innovates as long as its post-
innovation proﬁts are larger then pre-innovation ones. Third, the eﬀect of a successful innovation is
limited and a ﬁrm can only advance “one step a time” over the “productivity ladder”. This implies
4Schor (2004) study on Brazil and more recently Lileeva and Treﬂer (2007) using Canadian plants data are two
notable exceptions.
3that if a ﬁrm is close to the productive frontier by innovating it will prevent entry of potential foreign
competitors.5 However, if a ﬁrm is far from the productive frontier then it does not have any chance
of preventing a foreign competitor from entering and taking over its market. In such a model, tariﬀs
reduction increases the entry threat and boosts the incentives of “advanced” ﬁrms to innovate in
order to preempt the potential foreign entry. For these ﬁrms, the increased competition reduces more
the pre-innovation proﬁts than post-innovation proﬁts because if the ﬁrm does not innovate it risks
losing all its market due to the entry of the foreign competitor. At the same time the consequences for
less productive ﬁrms are very diﬀerent because the increased entry threat reduces the post-innovation
proﬁts more than the pre-innovation ones. In fact, the “laggard incumbents” (i.e. less productive)
cannot prevent the entry of foreign competitors, even when able of innovating succesfully because
they are too far from the productive frontier.
Also, related to this paper is the large set of studies arguing that increased competition puts pres-
sures on “slacking managers” and pushes them to reduce the X-ineﬃciency (Martin 1978, Martin and
Page 1983, Leibenstein 1978). However, all these studies rely on a set of restrictive assumptions and
normally assume that ﬁrms are homogeneous (Rodrik 1988).
Our work is clearly linked to previous empirical studies analysing the eﬀect of competition on innova-
tive activities and productivity growth even if the earlier studies could only rely on industry-level data
(Gerosky 1990, Haskel 1992). Even more relevant to our study are the more recent analysis using ﬁrm-
level data to evaluate the impact of competition on productivity and innovation (Nickell 1996, Disney,
Haskel, and Heden 2003) as well as the studies evaluating directly the impact of trade liberalization
on ﬁrm-level productivity (Tybout and Westbrook 1995, Pavcnik 2002, Fernandes 2007, De Hoyos
and Iacovone 2006). However, as previously mentioned, these studies focus on the average eﬀect of
liberalization and do not account for the possibility that this eﬀect could diﬀerent across heterogenous
ﬁrms. Two notable exceptions, that we are aware of, are Schor (2004) Lileeva and Treﬂer (2007) that
allow for the impact of liberalization to be heterogenous across diﬀerent ﬁrms but use a diﬀerent
methodology from the one adopted in this paper.
In the same spirit of our study, a couple of recent papers analysed the impact of FDI spillovers and
5Foreign competitors are assumed to be at the frontier, therefore when they enter the domestic market they force
domestic ﬁrms that are not at the frontier to exit because they can produce the same good more eﬃciently. Another
possibility is that even if foreign ﬁrms don’t produce exactly the same good their entry on the domestic market can
increase the elasticity of substitution of domestic consumers and push mark-ups of domestic ﬁrms down, in this case
only more productive ﬁrms would be able to survive in the more competitive environment. The bottom line is that
increased competition will aﬀect the elasticity of demand and therefore the markup of domestic ﬁrms. In fact, enhanced
import competition can also shift the demand for domestic varieties in and, even with ﬁxed markups, domestic ﬁrms
are worse oﬀ as they have to spread their ﬁxed costs over a reduced output.
4foreign ownership exploring the possibility of heterogenous impacts on ﬁrms with diﬀerent produc-
tivity levels (Griﬃth, Redding, and Simpson 2003, Sabirianova, Terrell, and Svejnar 2005).
This paper is very much part of the growing literature on heterogeneous ﬁrms showing how ﬁrm
heterogeneity interacts with external policy changes generating dynamics that ﬁts much better the
empirical evidence (Jovanovic 1982, Hopenhayn 1992, Melitz and Ottaviano 2003, Melitz 2003, Help-
man, Melitz, and Yeaple 2004, Bernard, Redding, and Schott 2004, Yeaple 2005). In particular these
studies show how the impact of liberalization and globalization is highly asymmetrical depending on
the initial productivity of the ﬁrms, with more productive ﬁrms beneﬁtting disproportionately more
from globalization than less productive ones.
3 Trade Liberalization and Productivity
3.1 The Facts
First of all, before starting to discuss more in details the NAFTA reform and its impact we think it
is crucial to draw the attention on the importance of micro-level heterogeneity. With this objective
we compare in Fig. 1 the log ratio of the median6 sectoral labor productivity to the median labor
productivity of the entire manufacturing sector (panel a) with the log ratio of the plant-level labor
productivity to the median productivity of its sector (panel b).7 Comparing these two graphs we
notice that the productivity spread between diﬀerent sectors is not much larger than the productivity
spread within sector. This conﬁrms the existence of a substantial degree of micro-level heterogeneity
within-sector and reinforces the importance of focusing on the potential heterogeneity of the impact
of the trade reforms. We are certainly not the ﬁrst to discover and emphasize the importance of
plant-level heterogeneity, in fact in an important review of various plant-level studies Tybout (2000)
noticed how one of the distinctive features of LDCs manufacturing sector is its dualism where “large
numbers of microentreprsises and a handful of modern, large-scale factories produce similar products
side by side”. Further, productivity dispersion is not necessarily a feature of developing countries as
remarked by Tybout (2000) and Bartelsman and Doms (2000). In fact, previous empirical studies
for both developing and developed countries have conﬁrmed the persistence of a high degree of het-
erogeneity even after a profound liberalization process. For example, in the case of Chile during the
6Using the mean instead than the the median lead to results substantially identical, however we prefer to show
the median because we think this is a better descriptive statistic in a situation where the distribution is particularly
skewed.
7Sector is deﬁned at the most disaggregated level allowed by the Mexican industrial classiﬁcation system (CMAP),
i.e. 6 digits.
51980s and 1990s Crespi (2005) found that ﬁrms in the top decile have labour productivities that are
256 percent larger than those in the bottom decile, while Disney, Haskel, and Heden (2003) found a


















−2 −1 0 1 2
Log Ratio of Median Sectoral Labour Productivity to Economy−Wide  Median Labour Productivity















−.5 0 .5 1 1.5 2
Log Ratio of Plant Labour Productivity to Median Sectoral Labour Productivity within 6−digits Sector
(b) Heterogeneity Within Sectors
Figure 1: Firms Heterogeneity (Source: INEGI, Aguascalientes)
Having shown some evidence on the importance of plant-level heterogeneity, we now want to show
how after the implementation of NAFTA we observe a remarkable increase in industrial inequality
with good ﬁrms getting better, and larger ﬁrms getting larger.
If we analyze the evolution of productivity9 during the period 1993-2002 we observe two fundamental
trends: a shift in the mean productivity, as Mexican ﬁrms became on average more productive, and
an increase in the spread of the productivity distribution.10 These trends emerge from ﬁgure 3 where
8The explanations for this heterogeneity can be divided into two mayor groups. Traditionally, researchers have
pointed towards supply-side explanations such as technological eﬀorts and uncertainty surrounding technological in-
vestments (Nelson 1981), management or ownership , human capital as well as complementary investments in organi-
zational capital, and matching between skills and organisation (Bartelsman and Doms 2000). For example the ﬁndings
that productivity ranking tends to be relatively stable seems to imply that managerial skills, or some other persistent
productivity shocks, are important determinants of this heterogeneity (Baily, Hulten, and Campbell 1992). Another
potential explanation, hard to pinpoint convincingly, points toward the existence of external economies as documented
by Krizan’s (1995) ﬁndings that there is a positive correlation between plant level productivity and regional economic
activities in various developing countries. More recently, Syverson (2004) suggested that also demand side reasons
can be important to explain this heterogeneity, in particular product heterogeneity and their substitutability plays an
important role. Finally, external to the ﬁrm, regulations and exposure to international competition can be important
in explaining part of the observed heterogeneity (Tybout 2001, Tybout 2000, Bartelsman and Doms 2000).
9We use as productivity index the value added labour productivity.
10We also test the hypothesis that the productivity spread got larger more formally by regressing the coeﬃcient of
variation, calculated within each narrowly deﬁned sector at six digits, on a linear trend. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient
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Figure 2: Import Tariﬀs Drop under NAFTA (Source: Secretaria de Economia, Mexico)
we plot present the distribution of the gap between each individual ﬁrm-level productivity and the
“productive frontier”, in years 1993 (dashed line), 1998 (dotted line) and 2002 (continuous line). The
gap is deﬁned as the log of the ratio between the average productivity of the top ﬁve ﬁrms in the
sector and the individual ﬁrm labour productivity.11 A larger ratio identiﬁes ﬁrms more distant from
the productive frontier. In ﬁgure 3 we observe the distribution moving rightward, indicating that the
gap between the average, or the median, Mexican ﬁrm and the “productive frontier” is expanding. At
the same time, we see that the right tail of the distribution is also getting fatter implying an increase
in the density of ﬁrms with larger gaps.
This expansion in productivity inequality is even more interesting if we consider that during this period
we observe the exit of a signiﬁcant number of less productive ﬁrms. In fact, ﬁg. 4 depicts the number
of number of exiting plants in Panel (a), and shows in Panel (b) that the average productivity of
exiting plants (dashed line) is always substantially smaller than the average productivity of surviving
ones (continuous line). In a nutshell, after NAFTA was implemented besides a substantial exit of less
productive plants, which should compress the productivity distribution by trimming its left tail, we
observe an increase in productivity inequality among surviving Mexican ﬁrms.
productivity among ﬁrms even within narrowly deﬁned sectors got larger during the period under analysis.
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Figure 3: Distance From Frontier (Source: INEGI, Aguascalientes)
To conclude this section we want to discuss the importance of the liberalization process under NAFTA.
During the 1990s Mexico underwent a process of deep integration with its the North-American
economies. This process marked the completion of a liberalization already started during the second
part of the 1980s. However, it is important to notice that, diﬀerently from the unilateral liberalization
of the 1980s, the liberalization under NAFTA locked in Mexican policy makers much more than the
previous reforms because of the credibility imposed by an agreement with a powerful counterpart.
Therefore, when considering the scope of the liberalization under NAFTA we need to take into ac-
count also the importance of this credibility eﬀect (Tomz 1997, Tornell and Esquivel 1995). In this
perspective, NAFTA implied a deeper liberalisation than the drop in the average tariﬀs would suggest.
would appear from just looking at the drop in the average tariﬀ. Furthermore in ﬁgure 2 we show that
the NAFTA tariﬀs12 drop was not negligible, while the average tariﬀ went down from about 16% in
1993 to less than 5% in 2002, the tariﬀ peak was reduced from about 70% in 1993 to about 20% in 2002.
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Figure 4: Firms Demography (Source: INEGI, Aguascalientes)
3.2 The Model
In order to explain the facts presented in the previous section, in particular the increase in the in-
dustrial inequality in a period of profound liberalization we develop a model with heterogenous ﬁrms
based on neo-Schumpeterian growth models. The key intuition here is that liberalization can generate
at the same time contrasting eﬀects on the incentives to innovate. On one side, higher competition can
hamper the innovative eﬀorts of incumbent ﬁrms by reducing their expected proﬁts.13 At the same
time, the liberalization may lead incumbent to increase their innovative eﬀorts in order to “escape
competition”. The synthesis provided by the neo-Schumpeterian growth models consists exactly in
allowing these two mechanisms to coexists and interplay, and in this manner it provides us with the
theoretical basis that could explain the stylised facts presented in Section 3.1.
Now we will brieﬂy sketch our model, which builds on the work of Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and
Zilibotti (2004) and Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth, and Howitt (2002). The principal innovation
of our model is that we relax the assumption that the impact of increased competition on backward
ﬁrms is invariably negative. Instead, we will allow also backward ﬁrms to be able to catch-up with the
productive frontier, even if this will be less likely because of their initially disadvantaged condition. We
characterize this model by discussing separately in each one of the following subsection (1) domestic
production, (2) innovation decision, (3) foreign competition, (4) equilibrium innovation.
13This eﬀect is referred to as “Schumpeterian eﬀect” by Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth, and Howitt (2002)
93.2.1 Domestic production
In the economy we have a ﬁnal good y that is produced using a continuum of intermediate goods v ∈
[1,0]. The production is described by equation 1 where xt(v) is the quantity used of the intermediate
input v and At(v) measures its productivity at time t, ﬁnally α is a parameter varying between 0 and 1.











Each intermediate good is produced by a monopolist14 at a constant marginal cost equal to one unit
of the ﬁnal good. The monopolist maximizes its proﬁts but its monopoly power is restricted by the
existence of a set of “fringe ﬁrms” that do not operate in equilibrium but could produce the same
input using χ unit of output. Basically χ is a parameter capturing the competition intensity and
is larger than 1. Therefore the maximum price that the monopolist can charge for the intermediate
good v is pt(v) and can be expressed in terms of the output that is the numeraire
pt(v) = χ (2)
Because the ﬁnal-good producing sector is perfectly competitive the price of the intermediate good v










The model can be then solved and Aghion and Griﬃth (2005) show that the proﬁt function15 is
inversely correlated with the strenght of th competition, proxied by χ, and positively correlated with
the productivity of the ﬁrm producing the intermediate input v as described in equation 5:
πt(v) = At(v)δ(χ) (5)
where






In each period the technological frontier evolves exogenously at a rate g as described by equa-
tion 7
14This assumption can be changed and have two producers competing for example under Bertrand competition.
15To conﬁrm this it is suﬃcient to substitute 4 and 4 in the equilibrium proﬁt that is πt(v) = (pt − 1)xt(v)
10At = At−1 (1 + g) (7)





Advanced or type 1 if at the end of t − 1 At−1 = At−1
Backward or type 2 if at the end of t − 1 At−1 = At−2
In order to characterise the innovation decsision we will assume that the advanced ﬁrm will success-
fully innovate, and catch up, with probability z, where z is exactly measuring its research eﬀort.
Analogously, also the backward ﬁrm is able to innovate, however, because of its relative position with
respect to the technological frontier, when it does innovate and move “one step forward” with proba-
bility z this is not enough to catch up with the frontier.16 In fact, in order to catch up the backward
ﬁrm needs to move “two steps ahead” over the technology ladder and to do so it needs to make an extra
innovation eﬀort. This extra eﬀort will be succesfull only with probability s, this being smaller than z.
In the original version of the model presented by Aghion and Griﬃth (2005) the backward ﬁrm does not
have any chance of catching up, that is innovating and moving “two steps ahead”, so the introduction
of this extra eﬀort and the fact that the backward ﬁrm is able to catch up with probability s is the
principal innovation of our model. However, in order to make this more realistic we will impose that
this probability s is lower than z, or in other words it is more likely that a ﬁrm is successful in moving
“one step” ahead rather than “two steps”. To simplify we can also assume that
s = θz
where θ is a parameter that we assume smaller than one but not smaller than g. Basically we want
to allow the backward ﬁrm to be able to catch up with the technological frontier.
g ≤ θ ≤ 1 (8)
Following Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and Zilibotti (2004) we assume that the cost of innovating is
quadratic in the research eﬀort and linear in the current technological level as in equation 9. However,
for backward ﬁrms we need to take into account also the cost of the extra-eﬀort. So the innovation











16We need to remember that the backwad ﬁrm has at the end of t − 1 a productivity equal to At−2
11At the end of every period, all ﬁrms that remain backward will then be upgraded automatically,
assuming there are spillovers from mature technology, and move up one step in the technology ladder.17
Also, at any moment t there is an exogenous probability h that any ﬁrm may exit and be replaced
by a new advanced ﬁrm at time t + 1.
3.2.3 Foreign competition
In every period foreign competitors can enter the domestic market, and their decision is done after
having observed the outcome of the innovation eﬀort of the domestic ﬁrms. A foreign company needs
to incur in a sunk cost equal to ξ to enter the domestic market. Once it has paid this, the ﬁrm will
be able to successfully penetrate the domestic market with probability µ.18 Because, foreign ﬁrms are
assumed to be at the technological frontier, if it does enter and faces a backward domestic ﬁrm, then
it gains the entire market if, otherwise, it faces a domestic ﬁrm at the frontier then they engage in
Bertrand competition and both ﬁrms will see their proﬁts go to zero. Consequently the entry threat





0 if domestic ﬁrm is at frontier in t − 1 and innovates succesfully in t
or is backward in t − 1 but able to reach the frontier in t
µ otherwise
3.2.4 Equilibrium innovation




E [π2t] = δ(χ)
 











because when, with probability z, this ﬁrm is successful in moving one step ahead and obtain a
productivity At−1, it will retain its domestic market only if the foreign ﬁrm does not enter.19 Similarly,
when it is unsuccessful at innovating with probability 1 − z and mantains productivity At−2, it will
retain its market only if the foreign ﬁrm does not enter, with probability 1 − µ. The backward ﬁrm
also engages in an extra-eﬀort to catch-up with productive frontier and, if successful, with probability
s, obtains a productivity equal to At and retains the market. While if unsuccesful, with probability
1 − s, it mantains productivity At−2 and retains its domestic market as long as the foreign ﬁrm is
unable to enter with probability 1 − µ. Solving this maximization problem we obtain the optimal
17This allows us to have only two types of ﬁrms to deal with.
18µ is a proxy capturing how diﬃcult is to enter the domestic market, i.e. tariﬀs and regulations directly aﬀect µ.
19The probability that the foreign ﬁrm is unsuccessful in entering the market is exactly 1 − µ.
12innovative eﬀort z∗





1 + θ2 [g (1 + 2θ + θg) + µ(θ − g)] (11)
At the same time the advanced ﬁrm choses its optimal innovation eﬀort z∗
1t maximising its expected
proﬁts π1t as in equation 12
max
z
E [π1t] = δ(χ)
 








because it retains the market when it successfully innovates, with probability z, and obtains a pro-
ductivity At, in which case the foreign ﬁrm stays out of the market. The advanced ﬁrm also keeps its
market if unsuccessful at innovating, with probability 1 − z, and a resulting productivity of At−1 as
long as, with probability 1 − µ, the foreign ﬁrm is unable to enter. Therefore the optimal innovation
eﬀort of this ﬁrm is equal to
z
∗
1t = δ(g + µ) (13)
After having derived the optimal innovative eﬀort for both ﬁrms, we can now determine what is the
eﬀect of a reduction in import barriers which increases entry threat. In particular we derive two











Prediction 1: Liberalization by increasing entry threat (µ) increases the optimal innovative
eﬀort of all types of ﬁrms
Prediction 2: Liberalization increases the optimal innovative eﬀort of advanced ﬁrms more
than that of backward ﬁrms
The ﬁrst prediction derives immediately from the fact that both δ and
(θ−g)
1+θ2 are positive. The second
prediction is a consequence of
(θ−g)
1+θ2 being smaller than one.
The predictions of our model are consistent with those of Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and Zilibotti
(2004) at industrial level because an increase in the foreign competition (increase in µ) expands in-
dustrial inequality as advanced ﬁrms react to it with a larger innovative eﬀort than backward ones.
However, when we analyze the model prediction at ﬁrm level, our model implies that the eﬀect of
liberalization is, on average, positive for both advanced and backward ﬁrms, while in Aghion, Burgess,
Redding, and Zilibotti (2004) the impact on backward ﬁrms innovative eﬀort is always negative be-
cause the Schumpeterian eﬀect dominates.
The predictions of our model are consistent with the basic intuition from the previous literature
on X-eﬃciency suggesting that increased competition is expected to spur eﬀorts (Leibenstein 1978),
13as well as various empirical studies analyzing the impact of trade reforms on productivity. These
studies normally found that the “average” eﬀect of increased competition is positive (Tybout and
Westbrook 1995, Fernandes 2007, De Hoyos and Iacovone 2006, Nickell 1996). In other words, our
model extends Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and Zilibotti (2004) and Aghion and Griﬃth (2005) by
making their predictions more in line with previous empirical studies but mantains intact its central
feature, which is that liberalization has an unequal eﬀect and advanced ﬁrms beneﬁt more from
it.
4 Econometric Analysis
The econometric analysis is split into two sub-sections. In the ﬁrst we brieﬂy describe the data
while in the second section we analyzed the relationship between liberalisation and productivity. In
particular we will build or empirical model in order to explore the potential ﬁrm heterogeneity and
allow the impact of liberalization to be dissimilar for diﬀerent types of ﬁrms.20
4.1 Data
The data used in this analysis are provided by INEGI and cover the entire period of NAFTA reforms,
1993-2002. The data are collected at plant level, and individual establishments are identiﬁed through
a unique key that allow us to build a panel.21 After having cleaned the dataset the number of
establishments varies between 6,500 and about 5,000 because of attrition.22 The sampling structure
of the survey is such that the data tend to be more representative of larger ﬁrms, overall the survey
covers 85% of industrial output excluding the“maquiladoras”. The survey frequency is yearly and
the variables collected cover various aspect of the ﬁrm’s operations: workers, wages, electricity usage,
intermediate inputs usage23, production, inventory, sales24, investment in diﬀerent types of physical
assets, investment in R&D and in technology transfers.25
20We will focus on one speciﬁc dimension of ﬁrm heterogeneity, namely productivity.
21This work was carried out while I was in Aguascalientes and in compliance with Mexican Laws protecting the
conﬁdentiality of the data.
22It is important to note that entry is not systematically captured by INEGI as the sample is refreshed only once
every ten years. However a speciﬁc department of INEGI tends to follow up on newspapers and other sources of
information the entry of new plants, in this way the most important new ﬁrms tend to be included even if this is not
systematic.
23The intermediate inputs used are split into imported and domestic inputs.
24As for intermediate inputs also the sales are split into domestic and foreign sales.
25For more details on the data see appendix A or refer to Iacovone (2008).
144.2 The Asymmetric Impact of Liberalization
In this section we will address two questions aiming at testing the predictions of our model. What is
the average impact of increased import competition on productivity growth? And is this impact the
same for all ﬁrms? The implicit assumption we make here is that productivity growth is an adequate
proxy of innovative eﬀorts.
It is a well documented feature of various ﬁrm-level studies that ﬁrms are heterogeneous in terms of
their productivity (Tybout 2000). At the same time various ﬁrm-level studies have shown that trade
liberalisation tends to inﬂuence positively the productivity of domestic ﬁrms (Pavcnik 2002, Roberts
and Tybout 1996). However, based on the theoretical model developed in section 3.2, we would also
expect the impact of increased foreign competition to be diﬀerent across ﬁrms with diﬀerent produc-
tivity levels.
In order to test this hypothesis, we ﬁrst calculate the domestic production frontier deﬁning it as the
average value added labour productivity26 of the top ﬁve ﬁrms in each sector27, and for every ﬁrm
we measure the distance from its domestic frontier as in equation 16. More speciﬁcally, for ﬁrm i
belonging to sector j this is equal to the ratio between the productive frontier πF
jt and its own labour
productivity πit. The wider the gap between the productivity of a ﬁrm and that of the “top ﬁrms”






To answer the questions just outlined at the beginning of this section we estimate equation 17. Our
explanatory variable is the growth of value added labour productivity of ﬁrm i between t and t + 1,
and our main explanatory variables are the distance from the frontier (DLFijt), the tariﬀs faced by its
foreign competitors in sector j and their interaction. We also add a number of plant level covariates,
as well as year dummies to absorb the eﬀect of macroeconomic shocks. We control for size, measured
by employment, capital intensity, measured by the ratio of capital stock to number of workers, and
average wages as a proxy for the quality of human capital. Finally, we also control for the plant
expenditures in R&D and technological transfers. All variables, except tariﬀs, are in logarithm29 and
we estimate the model using both OLS and FE estimators. Because we have a lagged dependent
26The value added labour productivity is calculated as the ratio between deﬂated value added and number of workers.
27Sector is deﬁned at four digits, based on the Mexican Classiﬁcation of Manufacturing Activities (CMAP94) and
each sector has in average between 98 and 132 plants, depending on the years, with the largest one having 470 plants
and the smallest 11.
28We follow in this calculation Griﬃth, Redding, and Simpson (2003).
29When performing the log transformation we add 1 to the value of the original variables to avoid that zero values
are transformed into missing values.
15variable in this equation appearing on the denominator of the distance index our estimates will be
biased (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p.764). In particular the OLS coeﬃcient will be downward biased
while the FE coeﬃcients will be upward bias (Arellano 2003).30
∆πijt = β0 + β1DLFijt−1 + β2Tjt−1 + β3Tjt−1 × DLFijt−1 + β4Xijt−1 + β5Y ear + µit (17)
Based on our model we expect β2 to be negative as lower tariﬀs should promote higher productivity
growth spurred by the increased competitive pressure. We also expect β3 to be positive, because,
as discussed in section 3.2 the impact of increased liberalisation is less positive for ﬁrms that are
more distant from the technological frontier. Finally, consistently with previous studies we expect β1
to be positive as ﬁrms lagging behind tend to catch up with their respective frontier (Alvarez and
Crespi 2007).
The main results are presented in table 7. In addition to the variables previously discussed, in the
OLS speciﬁcation we also include industry, state and year ﬁxed eﬀects. We ﬁrst present a set of
regressions where only include our main variables of interest and the ﬁxed eﬀects, models (1) and (2),
and then include also the plant-level controls, models (3) and (4). Consistently with our expectations
on the bias induced by the lagged dependent variable, the coeﬃcient on the variable measuring the
distance from frontier, which contains a lagged dependent variable in its denominator, appears to be
larger in the FE than in the OLS. However it is important to underline that the qualitative results
do not change between the two models. In fact, no matter which estimate we choose, in both models
these variables are positive and signiﬁcant.
Table 7 here
Our main ﬁnding is that the productivity of ﬁrms facing lower tariﬀs tends to grow faster but this
productivity eﬀect is lower for ﬁrms with larger distance from the productive frontier as the coeﬃcient
on the interaction is positive. The coeﬃcients of the remaining variables are consistent with what
we would have expected a-priori. In particular, we ﬁnd evidence of catching up as distance from
frontier positively aﬀects subsequent productivity growth. It is also interesting to notice that the
productivity of larger and more capital intensive ﬁrms tends to grow faster. Also, as expected, the
productivity of ﬁrms paying higher wages grows faster. And ﬁnally, higher expenditures in R&D and
technology transfers promote faster productivity growth. However, these control variables are likely
to be endogenous; therefore, we do not want to push too much on their interpretation. In fact the
principal purpose of introducing them is to control for ﬁrms’ characteristics that may be correlated
with the productivity growth and therefore, if omitted, could bias our principal coeﬃcients of interest.
30A possible extension to try to address this issue is to use a GMM estimator which makes use of the longitudinal
dimension of the data to build appropriate instruments using the lagged variables. However in our case the reduced
size of the longitudinal dimension makes the use of GMM less attractive, therefore we did not pursue this strategy.
16For this reason in columns (1) and (2) of table 7 we exclude these regressors in order to conﬁrm that
their inclusion is not crucial for our results.
Because of the presence of the interaction we can calculate the impact of a percentage change in tariﬀs
on productivity growth for diﬀerent types of ﬁrms depending on their distance from the productive
frontier.31 In ﬁgure 4.2 we graph these marginal eﬀects based on the results from column (3) and (4)
of table 7. The bottom line is that for most of the plants, except those in the top decile, e.g. the
ones that are more distant from the production frontier, the tariﬀs reduction spurs their productivity
growth.
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Figure 5: Marginal eﬀect of Tariﬀs on Productivity Growth
The results from table 7 just discussed conﬁrm the two basic predictions of the model. After having
presented our main results, we will now discuss a set of potential concerns that may invalidate our
ﬁndings and assess if these are truly robust.
First of all, an important issue to be discussed is the possibility that tariﬀs could be endogenous.
Fundamentally we think this is not a major problem for two reasons. The main reason is that while it
is reasonable to expect that an entire industry is be likely to be able to inﬂuence its tariﬀs schedule, it
is harder for a plant alone to inﬂuence the tariﬀs set for its entire industry. Therefore, if our analysis
31Our β of interest is equal to β2 + β3 ∗   LogDistance.
17was done using industry-level data we would be concerned about tariﬀs endogeneity while we think
this is not a major issue in our study as we focus on plant-level data.
Moreover, if we analyze the way NAFTA negotiations were carried out we can strenghten our con-
ﬁdence about the Mexican tariﬀs phase out being exogenous. First, the NAFTA agreement faced
Mexico with bilateral negotiations with partners that had more inﬂuence and negotiating power.
Additionally, the negotiations were carried out in a relatively short period of time which reduces
the possibility of external interventions and interferences from individual ﬁrms. Moreover, the high
degree of uncertainty that surrounded the US Congress approval of NAFTA suggests that Mexican
negotiators focused their minds on supporting the negotiating process to increase the chances of
NAFTA being approved, rather than trying to defend the interests of individual ﬁrms.32 Indeed,
these anecdotal remarks are consistent with the ﬁndings of Kowalczyk and Davis (1996) who argue
that while for US tariﬀs there is evidence that higher duties and sectors with lower intra-industry
trade were characterized by slower phase out, there is not such evidence when we analyze the phase
out of Mexican tariﬀs except that these appear correlated with US phase-out.33
Finally, to dispel some remaining doubts we analyze the evolution of Mexican tariﬀs under NAFTA
and observe that, even at a rather disaggregated level (i.e. 6 digits), the rankings of the diﬀerent
tariﬀs are rather stable. This is shown by table 3 in appendix A where we split the tariﬀs in deciles
and calculate the transition probabilities during the period under analysis. A similar conclusion is
reached if we observe table 4 where we calculate the Spearman rank correlation between tariﬀs. The
conclusion from this table is that, no matter which pair of years we consider, we can always reject the
null hypothesis that the two tariﬀ schedules are independent. This suggests that whatever the polit-
ical economy was behind the tariﬀs structure this did not change much during the NAFTA period,
therefore using 6-digits industry ﬁxed eﬀects we control for these time-invariant industry characteris-
tics aﬀecting the political economy of tariﬀs liberalization.34
In appendix B.2 we also present a set of additional regressions (see tables 8 and 9) in order to check
the robustness of our results.
First of all we exclude from our analysis the “top plants” used to calculate the productive frontier.
32NAFTA was only approved by the US Congress only on December 8th,1993, by a narrow majority of 234-200 vote
and it took eﬀect after less than one month on January 1st, 1994.
33Kowalczyk and Davis (1996) argue that empirical analysis at ﬁve-digit SITC level “suggests that from the perspec-
tive of Mexican negotiations, many other issues, including the overriding one of obtaining free trade in the near future
with its Northern neighbours, were given higher priority than the questions of how to phase duties out”
34A similar argument and solution is proposed by Schor (2004) and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005).
18Because these plants have been used to calculate the productive frontier we can expect that there will
be some correlation, by construction, between the productive frontier and their productivity which
could bias our results. The results are reported in columns (5) to (8) of table 8 in appendix B.2 and
conﬁrm that the exclusion of these plants does not inﬂuence our conclusions.
Secondly, because our dataset is an unbalanced panel and include plants that at some point are closed
down and exit from the sample we are concerned that exiting could inﬂuence our results. In order to
address this problem we ﬁrst of all introduce a dummy variables that is equal to one when a ﬁrm will
be exiting in the year and zero otherwise. The results are reported in columns (9) and (10) of table 8
and we notice that indeed the performance of exiting ﬁrms is, in the year before exiting, clearly worse
than that of other ﬁrms. However the main coeﬃcients of interest, i.e. the coeﬃcient on tariﬀs and
on the interaction between tariﬀs and distance from productive frontier, are substantially unchanged.
We also repeat our estimations using a balanced panel and excluding altogether exiting plants from
the sample, the results are reported in columns (11) and (12) of table 8. In this case, even if the main
coeﬃcients of interest are still signiﬁcant and have the expected signs we observe that, diﬀerently
from previous results, the coeﬃcient on the interaction between tariﬀs and distance from frontier is
larger in the OLS than in the FE model, we think this is probably a consequence of the selection bias
generated when using a balanced panel and excluding all exiting plants.
In all our discussion we have assumed that increased competition and entry threat, captured by a
reduction in Mexican tariﬀs under NAFTA, are having an uneven eﬀect on ﬁrms with diﬀerent pro-
ductivity level. However, it is also possible that Mexican tariﬀs maybe capturing some other eﬀect.
For example, if Mexican tariﬀs and US tariﬀs under NAFTA are correlated35 the reduction in Mex-
ican tariﬀs may be identifying the impact of enhanced market access under NAFTA as we have not
included US tariﬀs in our baseline regressions. To address this problem we include US tariﬀs and their
interaction with distance from frontier. The results are reported in table 9 in appendix B.2, where
in columns (13) and (14) we exclude the plant-level controls while in columns (15) and (16) we also
include them36. For simplicity we will concentrate on the results reported in columns (15) and (16)
as these are substantially similar to the ones where we exclude the plant-level controls. The principal
conclusion is that the inclusion of US tariﬀs does not change our previous results, the coeﬃcients on
Mexican tariﬀs and their interaction with distance from frontier are substantially identical. Further,
it is interesting to notice that the increased access to US markets has a similar positive eﬀect on
productivity as the increase of domestic competition, in fact the size of the coeﬃcients on US tariﬀs
is very close to that on Mexican tariﬀs. Additionally, it is intriguing to notice that, in line with the
predictions of recent trade models with heterogenous ﬁrms (Melitz 2003), also the expanded market
35I thank Eric Verhoogen for this remark.
36Notice that in these regressions we also include a dummy to control for exiting ﬁrms
19access aﬀects asymmetrically domestic ﬁrms with more productive ﬁrms beneﬁtting more.
As a further robustness check we test if our results are inﬂuenced by the 1994 peso devaluation. It
is fair to argue that, simultaneously to the NAFTA reforms, Mexican ﬁrms were also aﬀected by
the devaluation shock which could also inﬂuence diﬀerent plants asymmetrically. In order to control
for this we introduce the interaction between real exchange rate and the distance from frontier as
additional control. The results are presented in Table 10 and show that the original impact of tariﬀs
is somewhat attenuated and while in the OLS estimation the interaction between tariﬀs and distance
from frontier is still positive and signiﬁcant, in the case of the ﬁxed-eﬀect estimation this remains
positive but becomes but marginally insigniﬁcant. At the same time, in the ﬁxed-eﬀect estimation
the sign of the interaction between exchange rate and distance from frontier is negative supporting
the idea that backward may have been negatively aﬀected by the devaluation, probably because these
were less able to reap the beneﬁts of enhanced competitiveness on the export market. Extending these
results, we restrict our sample to those products where quality diﬀerences are particularly important
as it is the case of those products that Rauch deﬁnes as “diﬀerentiated” (Rauch 1999). The reason is
that while for “homogenous products” we expect that what matters are mostly cost-cutting innova-
tion, and the scope for innovation is therefore more limited, diﬀerently for “diﬀerentiated” products
we expect that the “potential quality diﬀerences” between products give to producers more room to
introduce not only cost-cutting process innovation but also product innovation. The results presented
in Table 11 conﬁrm our intuition and show that the impact of liberalization on productivity growth is
actually larger and, besides controlling for the interaction of exchange rate with distance from frontier,
the interaction between tariﬀs and distance from frontier is actually positive in all of our speciﬁcations.
To conﬁrm these results pointing towards the importance of the “technology channel”, we split our
sample based on the average sectoral R&D intensity in the pre-NAFTA period and we re-estimate our
model just focusing on those sectors with that have an R&D intensity above the economy-wide me-
dian (in other words we focus on the top half most R&D intensive sectors). The results are reported
in Table 11 and even more conﬁrm that our main results are stronger for those sectors where the
importance of innovative eﬀort is particularly important which is what our model would also suggest.
In a nutshell, the patterns observed previously that liberalization spurs innovative eﬀorts especially
in ﬁrms that are more advanced appear to be reinforced if we focus only on those sectors where the
scope for innovative activity is larger, both in terms of product and process innovation.
Finally, in order to dispel the possibility that a key driver in our results is access to ﬁnance. We include
a triple interaction in order to analyze if our results are stronger in those sectors characterized by
more pronounced dependence on external ﬁnance. We add to our main interaction between distance
20from frontier and tariﬀs also the Rajan-Zingales index37 measuring the dependence from extenrnal
ﬁnance (Rajan and Zingales 1998). The results are reported in Table 13 and conﬁrm that our main
results appear not to be driven by ﬁnancial constraints as the coeﬃcient of the triple interaction is
not statistically diﬀerent from zero.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that it is important, when analyzing the impact of exogenous policy
shocks, to take into account micro-level heterogeneity. We started from a stylized fact showing an
increase in the industrial inequality after NAFTA was implemented, despite a substantial exit of less
productive plants. In order to rationalize such result we developed a neo-Schumpeterian growth model
predicting that the impact of liberalization is asymmetric across diﬀerent types of ﬁrms, with “good
ﬁrms” beneﬁtting more from the increase in competitive pressures than “bad ones”. In this model ,
the liberalization tends to generate two competing eﬀects: on one side it spurs more innovative eﬀorts,
because of the increased entry threat by foreign competitors. On the other side, enhanced competi-
tion curtails expected proﬁts and reduces the resources available to nance innovative activities. The
“pro-competitive eﬀect” is weaker for less advanced ﬁrms as for them it is harder to catch-up with
the “technology frontier”.
We tested the predictions from our theoretical model and conﬁrm that indeed liberalization aﬀected
asymmetrical diﬀerent types of ﬁrms. In particular, a 10 percent reduction in tariﬀs spurred av-
erage productivity growth between 4 and 8 percent. However, while for backward ﬁrms this eﬀect
is much weaker if not close to zero, otherwise for more advanced ones this eﬀect is stronger with
productivity growing between 11 and 13 percent. Furthermore we showed that, as a conﬁrmation of
the technology-channel, these results appear to be stronger in those sectors where the scope for the
innovative activities is more pronounced.
These ﬁndings have various implications. In the context of the empirical debate on the relationship
between trade liberalization and growth they suggest that we should not be surprised by evidence
that the eﬀects of liberalization vary across countries because this could just be the consequence
that the distribution of productivity across countries before the reforms diﬀer. Furthermore, for
policy makers being aware of the possible heterogenous eﬀects of the reforms is potentially even
more important than knowing about the average impact of the reforms in order to devise appropriate
37This index is a proxy to characterize the degree of dependence from external funds of a speciﬁc sector (at 4
digits) and it is equal to the average ratio of capital expenditures not ﬁnanced with internal funds over total capital
expenditures during the 1980-1990.
21complementary policies and anticipate the political economy of the responses to the proposed reforms.
Finally, these ﬁndings open the avenue to further research toward better understand why identical
policies may have an asymmetric impact on heterogenous ﬁrms. In particular, we would like to
explore the mechanisms behind these heterogeneous reactions to liberalization. Are these determined
by innovative eﬀorts, product innovation, reorganization of the productive processes and training
of the workforce? Answering these questions is particularly important for policy makers because it
may suggest that while increasing competition may be good in spurring average productivity, it is
also true that this eﬀect may not hold for all type of ﬁrms. Therefore some complementary policies
may be needed to support weaker ﬁrms to upgrade their capacities and keep up with the enhanced
competitive environment. Clarifying these questions would help us to identify which type of policies
would be more appropriate.
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26A Appendix: Data
The Encuesta Industrial Anual (EIA) is an annual industrial survey that covers the Mexican manu-
facturing sector, with the exception of “maquiladoras.” The EIA was originally started in 1963 and
then expanded in subsequent years, with the last expansion taking place in 1994 after the 1993 census.
The post-1993 EIA includes 6,867 plants spread across 205 classes of activity representing the most
important sector of manufacturing activities in Mexico based on the 1993 industrial census. In our
analysis, we use the information for the 1993-2002 period and after cleaning the number of plants is
reported in table 1
Table 1: Number of plants and exporters












The sampling scheme is deterministic and based on the 1993 industrial census. For each one of the 205
selected “clase” the largest plants are selected up to the point when at least 85% of industrial output
has been covered. In those cases where the average size of plants is very small (e.g. “fragmented
classes”) up to a maximum of 120 plants are included and the coverage may fall to about 60-70%
of the total industrial output in that speciﬁc “clase”. At the same time, for those cases where the
“clase” is highly concentrated (i.e. less than 20 plants) all plants are included with a coverage of
100%.
The unit of observation is a plant described as ”the manufacturing establishment where the production
takes place”. Each plant is classiﬁed in its respective class of activity based on the basis of its
principal product. The class of activity is equivalent to the 6-digit level CMAP (Mexican System of
Classiﬁcation for Productive Activities) classiﬁcation.
In the EIA plants can be tracked through time thanks to a speciﬁc plant identiﬁer.
27A.1 Data Cleaning and Deﬂation
The original data have been deﬂated using appropriate deﬂators provided by Banco de Mexico. The
values of domestic sales was deﬂated using the domestic price producer index and the value of exports
sales was deﬂated using the export price index. We also deﬂated separately the intermediate inputs
using for the domestic inputs the price index published by Banco de Mexico38 while for the imported
inputs we used the index of exported intermediate inputs and raw materials published by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics39. We also separately deﬂated the wage bill using the domestic consumer price
index. Finally we deﬂated the value of investment in ﬁxed assets by using four diﬀerent deﬂators for
each one of the diﬀerent types of assets kindly provided by Banco de Mexico (i.e. machineries, oﬃce
equipment, transport equipment, buildings and land).
In order to clean the data and correct for eventual inputing mistakes and outliers we trimmed the
data and eliminated the largest and smallest 1% of the observations.
Also, because the EIA only provides information on capital stock at book value, we use the information
from the Industrial Census of 1993 to obtain the exact value of capital stock at its replacement value
as the initial capital stock.
We complement the data obtained from the industrial survey with information on Mexican tariﬀs





28Table 2: Variables description
Variable Name Description
Domestic Frontier Growth Growth of the average labour productivity of top ﬁve ﬁrms in the sector
Distance from Frontier Ratio of domestic frontier to plant speciﬁc labour productivity
Employment Total number of workers (white collars and blue collars)
Average Wages Total wage bill divided by number of emplooyees
R&D Expenses in in-house research and development
Technology transfers Expenses to acquire technology (patents, engineering services, consultancy, etc.)
Exiting Plant Dummy equal to 1 if the plant will exit the sample in the following year and zero otherwize
Capital Intensity Ratio of capital stock divided by the total number of workers
US Tariﬀs US Tariﬀs applied to Mexican products agreed under NAFTA
MX NAFTA Tariﬀ Mexican tariﬀs applied to US and Canadian products agreed under NAFTA
2
9Table 3: Tariﬀs Stability - Transition Matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
1 80.82 9.59 4.57 1.83 1.37 0.91 0 0.46 0 0.46 100
2 11.92 63.58 17.88 1.99 1.99 0.66 1.99 0 0 0 100
3 5.52 7.73 58.56 20.99 2.21 1.66 2.76 0.55 0 0 100
4 4.95 1.65 12.64 49.45 27.47 1.1 2.2 0.55 0 0 100
5 2.19 3.28 3.83 16.39 51.37 16.39 3.28 2.73 0 0.55 100
6 2.86 2.86 1.71 4.57 10.86 55.43 16.57 3.43 1.14 0.57 100
7 0 1.58 0 0.53 2.63 12.11 60 18.95 4.21 0 100
8 0 0 2.86 1.71 0.57 6.86 14.29 57.14 13.71 2.86 100
9 0 1.08 0.54 0.54 2.16 2.7 3.24 14.05 66.49 9.19 100
10 0 0 0 0 0 0.57 0.57 0 12.07 86.78 100
Total 12.29 8.26 10.03 9.81 10.08 9.7 10.63 9.7 9.81 9.7 100
3
0Table 4: Tariﬀs Stability - Spearman Rank Correlation
MXTariﬀ93 MXTariﬀ94 MXTariﬀ95 MXTariﬀ96 MXTariﬀ97 MXTariﬀ98 MXTariﬀ99 MXTariﬀ2000 MXTariﬀ2001
MXTariﬀ1993 1
MXTariﬀ1994 0.7182 1
MXTariﬀ1995 0.711 0.9943 1
MXTariﬀ1996 0.6886 0.9693 0.9877 1
MXTariﬀ1997 0.6488 0.9203 0.9522 0.9854 1
MXTariﬀ1998 0.5677 0.8096 0.8576 0.9173 0.9683 1
MXTariﬀ1999 0.4466 0.6675 0.722 0.7961 0.8705 0.9382 1
MXTariﬀ2000 0.4451 0.6663 0.7212 0.7958 0.8706 0.937 0.9995 1
MXTariﬀ2001 0.3129 0.4865 0.5244 0.5792 0.6344 0.6919 0.747 0.7447 1
MXTariﬀ2002 0.3118 0.4806 0.5174 0.5708 0.6256 0.681 0.7362 0.7344 0.9975
3
1Table 5: Log of the distance from productive frontier - summary statistics

























33Table 7: Asymmetric eﬀect of liberalisation
OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Domestic Frontier Growth 0.240*** 0.392*** 0.260*** 0.391***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
MX Tariﬀs NAFTA (lagged) -0.013*** -0.017*** -0.012*** -0.015***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Distance from Frontier (lagged) 0.112*** 0.500*** 0.173*** 0.499***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011)
Distance x Tariﬀs (lagged) 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.002*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Employment (lagged) 0.045*** 0.086***
(0.003) (0.013)
Capital Intensity (lagged) 0.021*** 0.004
(0.002) (0.003)
Average Wages (lagged) 0.083*** -0.026
(0.009) (0.016)
R&D (lagged) 0.004*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.002)
Technology Transfers (lagged) 0.006*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.002)
Industry FE (6 digits) Yes No Yes No
Location FE Yes No Yes No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant FE No Yes No Yes
Plant-level controls No No Yes Yes
N 44948 44948 44176 44176
r2 0.056 0.214 0.075 0.217
34B.2 Robustness Checks
35Table 8: Robustness checks of asymmetric eﬀect of liberalisation: exclude “top plants”
Exclude top plants Exclude top plants + control for exiting
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Domestic Frontier Growth 0.232*** 0.379*** 0.251*** 0.378*** 0.254*** 0.380*** 0.268*** 0.379***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
MX Tariﬀs NAFTA (lagged) -0.014*** -0.018*** -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Distance from Frontier (lagged) 0.132*** 0.507*** 0.193*** 0.507*** 0.201*** 0.519*** 0.217*** 0.521***
(0.007) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012)
Distance x Tariﬀs (lagged) 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Employment (lagged) 0.052*** 0.100*** 0.046*** 0.076*** 0.037*** 0.030**
(0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.012)
Capital Intensity (lagged) 0.021*** 0.003 0.018*** 0.001 0.012*** 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Average Wages (lagged) 0.079*** -0.024 0.083*** -0.033** 0.079*** -0.077***
(0.009) (0.017) (0.009) (0.016) (0.008) (0.015)
R&D (lagged) 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Technology Transfers (lagged) 0.006*** 0.004** 0.006*** 0.004** 0.007*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Exiting Plant -0.662*** -0.661***
(0.039) (0.038)
Balanced panel No No No No No No Yes Yes
Industry FE (6 digits) Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Location FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Plant-level controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 42872 42872 42125 42125 42125 42125 36358 36358
r2 0.069 0.220 0.089 0.224 0.113 0.245 0.134 0.252
3
6Table 9: Robustness checks of asymmetric eﬀect of liberalisation: controlling for US tariﬀs
OLS FE OLS FE
(13) (14) (15) (16)
Domestic Frontier Growth 0.243*** 0.387*** 0.262*** 0.386***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
MX Tariﬀs NAFTA (lagged) -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
US Nafta Tariﬀ (lagged) -0.007* -0.015*** -0.005 -0.013***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Distance from Frontier (lagged) 0.141*** 0.516*** 0.200*** 0.515***
(0.007) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012)
Distance x MX Tariﬀs (lagged) 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Distance x US Tariﬀs (lagged) 0.003 0.005** 0.002 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Exiting Plant -0.714*** -0.692*** -0.677*** -0.671***
(0.040) (0.038) (0.040) (0.039)
Employment (lagged) 0.046*** 0.080***
(0.003) (0.013)
Capital Intensity (lagged) 0.018*** 0.001
(0.002) (0.003)
Average Wages (lagged) 0.085*** -0.034**
(0.009) (0.017)
R&D (lagged) 0.004** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.002)
Technology Transfers (lagged) 0.006*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.002)
Industry FE (6 digits) Yes No Yes No
Location FE Yes No Yes No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant FE No Yes No Yes
Plant-level controls No No Yes Yes
N 41480 41480 40760 40760
r2 0.098 0.245 0.115 0.247
37Table 10: Robustness checks of asymmetric eﬀect of liberalisation: controlling also for exchange rate
OLS FE OLS FE
(17) (18) (19) (20)
Domestic Frontier Growth 0.243*** 0.389*** 0.262*** 0.387***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
MX Tariﬀs NAFTA (lagged) -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
US Nafta Tariﬀ (lagged) -0.006 -0.008 -0.003 -0.007
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Distance from Frontier (lagged) 0.177*** 0.666*** 0.240*** 0.652***
(0.027) (0.031) (0.028) (0.032)
Distance x Exchange Rate (lagged) -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance x MX Tariﬀs (lagged) 0.002** 0.002 0.002* 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Distance x US Tariﬀs (lagged) 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Exiting Plant -0.714*** -0.688*** -0.677*** -0.669***
(0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039)
Employment (lagged) 0.046*** 0.074***
(0.003) (0.013)
Capital Intensity (lagged) 0.018*** 0.001
(0.002) (0.003)
Average Wages (lagged) 0.085*** -0.035**
(0.009) (0.017)
R&D (lagged) 0.004** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.002)
Technology Transfers (lagged) 0.006*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.002)
Industry FE (6 digits) Yes No Yes No
Location FE Yes No Yes No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant FE No Yes No Yes
Plant-level controls No No Yes Yes
N 41480 41480 40760 40760
r2 0.098 0.246 0.115 0.248
38Table 11: Robustness checks of asymmetric eﬀect of liberalisation: focus on diﬀerentiated products
OLS FE OLS FE
(21) (22) (23) (24)
Domestic Frontier Growth 0.209*** 0.353*** 0.228*** 0.351***
(0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015)
MX Tariﬀs NAFTA (lagged) -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
US Nafta Tariﬀ (lagged) 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Distance from Frontier (lagged) 0.181*** 0.657*** 0.245*** 0.636***
(0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.034)
Distance x Exchange Rate (lagged) -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000* -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance x MX Tariﬀs (lagged) 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Distance x US Tariﬀs (lagged) -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Exiting Plant -0.715*** -0.689*** -0.675*** -0.661***
(0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040)
Employment (lagged) 0.048*** 0.095***
(0.004) (0.014)
Capital Intensity (lagged) 0.018*** 0.000
(0.002) (0.003)
Average Wages (lagged) 0.085*** -0.021
(0.010) (0.017)
R&D (lagged) 0.004** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.002)
Technology Transfers (lagged) 0.006*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.002)
Industry FE (6 digits) Yes No Yes No
Location FE Yes No Yes No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant FE No Yes No Yes
Plant-level controls No No Yes Yes
N 36392 36392 35739 35739
r2 0.099 0.246 0.116 0.248
39Table 12: Robustness checks of asymmetric eﬀect of liberalisation: focus on R&D intensive sectors
OLS FE OLS FE
(25) (26) (27) (28)
Domestic Frontier Growth 0.214*** 0.375*** 0.245*** 0.375***
(0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024)
MX Tariﬀs NAFTA (lagged) -0.026*** -0.036*** -0.026*** -0.032***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
US Nafta Tariﬀ (lagged) 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Distance from Frontier (lagged) -0.007 0.499*** 0.074 0.515***
(0.068) (0.070) (0.067) (0.071)
Distance x Exchange Rate (lagged) 0.000* 0.000 0.000* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance x MX Tariﬀs (lagged) 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Distance x US Tariﬀs (lagged) -0.006 -0.010* -0.006 -0.011**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Exiting Plant -0.694*** -0.646*** -0.634*** -0.620***
(0.080) (0.087) (0.077) (0.085)
Employment (lagged) 0.054*** 0.058**
(0.006) (0.024)
Capital Intensity (lagged) 0.023*** -0.004
(0.004) (0.005)
Average Wages (lagged) 0.102*** -0.038
(0.016) (0.029)
R&D (lagged) 0.006*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002)
Technology Transfers (lagged) 0.004*** 0.003
(0.001) (0.003)
Industry FE (6 digits) Yes No Yes No
Location FE Yes No Yes No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant FE No Yes No Yes
Plant-level controls No No Yes Yes
N 14404 14404 14206 14206
r2 0.090 0.257 0.117 0.257
40Table 13: Robustness checks of asymmetric eﬀect of liberalisation: exploring relevance of ﬁnancial
dependence
OLS FE OLS FE
Domestic Frontier Growth 0.220*** 0.368*** 0.239*** 0.366***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
MX Tariﬀs NAFTA (lagged) -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
US Nafta Tariﬀ (lagged) -0.004 -0.012** -0.003 -0.009*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Distance from Frontier (lagged) 0.138*** 0.523*** 0.189*** 0.522***
(0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.016)
Distance x MX Tariﬀs (lagged) 0.003** 0.005*** 0.002** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Distance x US Tariﬀs (lagged) 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
MX Tariﬀs x RZ -0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Distance x RZ -0.012 -0.047 0.018 -0.043
(0.025) (0.032) (0.024) (0.032)
MX Tariﬀ x Dist x RZ 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Exiting Plant -0.709*** -0.687*** -0.671*** -0.665***
(0.039) (0.038) (0.040) (0.039)
Employment (lagged) 0.047*** 0.085***
(0.003) (0.013)
Capital Intensity (lagged) 0.018*** 0.001
(0.002) (0.003)
Average Wages (lagged) 0.083*** -0.034**
(0.009) (0.017)
R&D (lagged) 0.004*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.002)
Technology Transfers (lagged) 0.006*** 0.004**
(0.001) (0.002)
Industry FE Yes No Yes No
Location FE Yes No Yes No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant FE No Yes No Yes
N 40739 40739 40029 40029
r2 0.096 0.241 0.113 0.244
41